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Introduction: Regional Governance in Greece
On 7 and 14 November 2010, Greece held its first elections for the regional
level of representation. The regional elections, which were held concurrently
with municipal elections across the country, were the result of the latest lo-
cal government reforms. In 1986, the governing Panhellenic Socialist Move-
ment (PASOK) created 13 administrative regions on top of the 54 prefectures.
These administrative regions (‘peripheries’ in Greek) did not always overlap
with the historical regions of the country since they were devised as develop-
ment regions in order to implement the EUfunded Integrated Mediterranean
Programmes (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 196) and to attract funds from the
Community Support Frameworks which followed suit. The regional secretary
generals (similar to the prefects but unlike the mayors and the municipal coun-
cils) were appointed by the central government. In 1994, PASOK ‘municipal-
ized’ and transformed the prefectures into a second-tier of local government by
initiating the direct election of prefects and prefecture councils which received
a limited number of competencies (Hlepas, 2010: 228). In yet another reform
implemented by PASOK in the late 1990s, the municipalities received extra
funding and competences after a compulsory amalgamation into 924 munici-
palities and 100 rural communes (see Hlepas, 2010: 230–235). With the return
of PASOK to power in 2009 (see Dinas, 2010; Gemenis, 2010; Pappas, 2010)
another compulsory amalgamation was initiated, this time reducing the number
of municipalities to 325. Moreover, the prefectures were abolished and replaced
by a regional tier of representation along the lines of the thirteen administrative
regions.
Each region acquired a directly elected governor (periferiarchis) and re-
gional council roughly proportional to its population. The Constitution stipulates
that political parties are not permitted to contest local and regional elections
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and, therefore, the elections are contested by open regional lists headed by a
candidate governor. In practice, however, most of these lists are openly cre-
ated, supported or otherwise endorsed by political parties. It is often the case
that political parties will use their local organizations in order to put together a
list, whereas MPs will head the lists as candidate governors. Moreover, internal
party disagreements can result in party cadres creating their own ‘rebel’ lists
to compete against the party-endorsed list. Particular local circumstances may
also induce several parties to support a single list or facilitate the creation of
genuinely independent lists.
The elections for the regional governors and councils take place every five
years under a two-round majority run-off electoral system where the winning
list elects the governor. The council seats, however, are allocated under a
complex electoral formula. When the winning list receives more than 60% of
the vote in the first round, all seats are allocated proportionally. When the win-
ning list earns between 50% and 60% of the vote in the first round, it earns
three-fifths of the seats, whereas the remaining two-fifths are allocated propor-
tionally among the remaining lists. In the case where no list earns at least 50%
in the first round, half of the seats are allocated proportionally among all the
lists, and the first two lists contest the second round. The remaining half of the
seats are allocated after the second round, with the winner earning as many
seats needed in order have the three-fifths of the total and the loser earning
the remaining seats. This formula is capable of particularly disproportional al-
locations of seats, especially in regions where more than 75% of the vote in
the first round is shared roughly equally among three or four lists. Regardless
of the disproportional formula, however, the absence of a legal threshold and
the relatively large district magnitude creates incentives for small parties and
independents to contest on lists of their own.
Background
The 2010 regional elections took place roughly a year after the 2009 parlia-
mentary election. At the outset, PASOK began its term with an ambitious pro-
gramme centred on the promise of a C3 billion stimulus package for the econ-
omy and ‘green development’ which was reflected in a remarkably high level of
support in the opinion polls (Gemenis, 2010: 360). Soon enough, however, the
government found itself in the middle of a serious fiscal crisis and, after rallying
for the creation of a support mechanism by the EU and the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF), asked for a bailout on 23 April (Gemenis, 2010: 361). As
the Greek government negotiated the terms of the bailout (dubbed ‘the memo-
randum’) with the representatives of the European Commission, the European
Central Bank and the IMF (dubbed ‘the troika’), its popularity rapidly decreased
in the opinion polls (Figure 1). As it became clear that the economic and fiscal
policies outlined in the memorandum included harsh austerity measures, trade
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unions and parties of the opposition staged a series of large-scale protests.
The protests turned violent when the government brought the memorandum to
be ratified in the parliament. During a demonstration, three bank employees
were killed after masked protesters threw petrol bombs into the building where
they were working.
The ratification statute voted by the parliament on a majority of 172 (out
of 300) showcased a rather peculiar set of accords. The Communist Party
of Greece (KKE) and the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) both voted
against. Although the radical-right Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) voted in
favour, the conservative New Democracy (ND) decided to tactically vote against
the statute. ND MP and former minister Dora Bakoyannis, however, voted in
favour and cited her (neo-)liberal credentials for doing so. It was clear, nev-
ertheless, that Bakoyannis was disgruntled after losing the previous yearâA˘Z´s
party leadership election to Antonis Samaras (Gemenis, 2010: 359–360) and
when Samaras expelled her from ND, she announced the possibility of forming
her own party. Bakoyannis was not the only MP who went against the party
whip. Three PASOK MPs abstained and the PASOK leader George Papan-




















Figure 1: Opinion polls voting estimates, April 2010–June 2011. Source:
Data from the Public Issue Barometer (various editions), available at
http://www.publicissue.gr
As strikes and protests became a daily occurrence, the government tried
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in vain to convince citizens that the measures were necessary. The opposi-
tion, however, was unable to propose a viable or credible alternative to the
memorandum. Samaras suggested that his party would ensure a bailout with-
out the need of adopting a memorandum but failed to point out who would
be willing to lend money to Greece without any guarantees that the country
would be able to pay back its lenders. The KKE suggested that Greece should
restructure its debt and pull out from the EU whereas the aged music com-
poser Mikis Theodorakis advanced conspiracy theories and internet rumours
that China had agreed to pay off Greece’s debt. SYRIZA was also hindered in
its attempt to mount a successful opposition against the government and the
troika due to its acute infighting (see Gemenis, 2010: 355–356). In February
2010, the former SYRIZA leader, Alekos Alavanos, announced the creation of
a separate umbrella group within the SYRIZA coalition and left open the possi-
bility of transforming it into a new party. Moreover, at the 6th party congress of
Synaspismos (SYN), the largest constituent of the SYRIZA coalition, in the fol-
lowing June many members of the Europeanist Ananeotiki faction walked out
and announced their intention to create a new political party. The new party
was soon named Democratic Left and included four defected SYN MPs (reduc-
ing the SYRIZA parliamentary group to nine MPs) as well as several hundred
SYN members. Under these circumstances, the opposition failed to capitalize
on the widespread discontent and the government was able to proceed with the
announced measures due to its clear parliamentary majority.
Against this background, PASOK decided to put together lists for 12 out
of the 13 regions, the exception being Peloponnese where the party decided
to support the list of independent Petros Tatoulis, a long-time ND MP who re-
signed his party whip in November 2008. PASOK, however, had to face some
rebels of its own. Yiannis Dimaras, one of the three MPs ousted by Papan-
dreou, and Giorgos Kaloudis announced that they would contest Attica and
Ionian Islands, respectively, with independent ‘anti-memorandum’ lists. Unlike
PASOK, ND decided to put together lists in all 13 regions, but apart from the
aforementioned rebel in the Peloponnese, they had to confront another rebel
list in Crete which was tacitly supported by Bakoyannis. As in previous pre-
fecture elections, LAOS adopted a pick-and-mix strategy by putting together
lists in six regions, supporting ND candidates in another four, supporting one
independent with PASOK (Peloponnese) and completely avoiding the socialist
bulwarks of Crete and East Macedonia & Thrace.
On the left, SYRIZA and the Democratic Left managed to compile eleven
and six lists, respectively, whereas the Ecologist Greens put together eight, as
well as three with the Democratic Left and another two with SYRIZA. More-
over, SYRIZA saw Alavanos rebel against the coalition candidate in Attica. Ala-
vanos contested Attica supported by his umbrella group which included some
of SYRIZA’s constituent parties. Unsurprisingly, KKE was the only party that
managed to compile lists in each and every region (consistently named ‘Popu-
lar Mobilization in [region]’) by avoiding both the emergence of rebels and the
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formation of electoral coalitions. Finally, a coalition of extreme left parties, the
Front of the Greek Anticapitalist Left (ANTARSYA, a pun on ‘mutiny’ in Greek)
compiled lists in eleven regions whereas far-right groups did so in another two.
The Election Campaign
Undoubtedly, a big portion of the campaign focused on the candidate governors
who were heading the lists. PASOK adopted the strategy of fielding highly
politically experienced persons as candidate governors. Ten out of their twelve
candidates were currently serving as prefects or MPs (including three junior
ministers). LAOS followed this strategy as well, with four active MPs, whereas
half of KKE and the Democratic Left candidates were either active or former
MPs. Conversely, SYRIZA and the Ecologist Greens showed a preference for
candidates who had previously served as prefecture councillors. Although ND
was particularly interested in capturing as many regions as possible, the fact
that Samaras was still seeking to consolidate his leadership meant that ND
would not nominate many MPs and prefects who did not support Samaras in
his bid for leadership. This can, therefore, explain choices like Vassilis Kikilias,
a former basketball player with little political experience, as the candidate for
the region of Attica which includes the wider Athens metropolitan area. Finally,
another interesting fact was that, although the law required lists to consist of
at least onethird of female candidates, only four of the 92 candidate governors
were women (all supported by parties of the left).
As soon as active campaigning began, it became clear that the candidates
faced a choice between emphasizing issues relating to regional governance or
try to turn the election into a protest against the memorandum and the troika.
PASOK insisted that the elections should focus on regional government issues
and that the election result should not necessarily reflect the popularity of the
government. The Ecologist Greens and the Democratic Left also supported
this view and hoped that they could attract votes on the virtue of their local gov-
ernment programmes and quality of candidates. For ND candidates and the
PASOK rebels, such as Dimaras, playing the anti-memorandum card offered
a good opportunity to take advantage of popular resentment over the auster-
ity measures and increase their share of the vote. Nevertheless, since the
governors would not be able to influence government policy, voting for an anti-
memorandum candidate could be interpreted only as a symbolic gesture. As
a consequence, both Dimaras and the candidates supported by ND reached a
compromise by publishing detailed manifestos which focused on local govern-
ment issues but nevertheless reiterated their opposition to the memorandum
and the troika. This prompted KKE to condemn them as opportunists. Similarly
to other candidates of the left, the candidates of KKE campaigned almost exclu-
sively on an anti-memorandum platform, something hardly surprising consider-
ing that KKE opposed the latest local government reforms in the first instance.
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Finally, LAOS, having voted in favour of the memorandum, had no choice but
to focus on other issues, such as law and order, and immigration.
As Papandreou realized that adherence to the regional character of the
elections would not be the most effective strategy against candidates who com-
bined a detailed regional election programme with anti-memorandum rhetoric,
he decided to change course of action. In a highly publicized interview which
was broadcast on 25 October, Papandreou confirmed that the government
viewed the elections as a vote of confidence on government policy as much
as a contest about electing regional governors and councils. Papandreou an-
nounced that, in the event where PASOK would lose the regional elections,
he would call for a snap parliamentary election sometime in the first half of
2011. Papandreou hoped to mobilize PASOK voters and steer those who in-
tended to vote for the anti-memorandum candidates, such as Dimaras, into
abstaining. This decision was met with criticism by the Ecologist Greens and
the Democratic Left which were left alone in supporting the regional character
of the elections, whereas the other opposition parties condemned it as blatant
political blackmail.
Interpreting the Results
In the first round of 7 November PASOK managed to elect two of its candidate
governors (Crete and South Aegean) whereas another five of its supported can-
didates headed the election into the second round. Most importantly, Dimaras
came third in the largest region of Attica and the second round against Kikilias
of ND was seen by PASOK as an easy victory (Table 1). The second round of
14 November, confirmed these expectations and PASOK ended up controlling
a total of seven regions and 43.6% of the council seats. Seen in conjunction
with the second round victories in the Athens and Thessaloniki municipal elec-
tions which were held on the same day1 and against the decline at the opinion
polls, PASOK considered the result as a moderate victory. Nevertheless, if we
were to translate support for PASOK candidates to support for PASOK, then
we would notice that the elections showed a sharp decline in the PASOK vote.
In fact, PASOK won the lowest absolute number of votes since 1977. More
than anything, however, PASOK avoided a crushing defeat and Papandreou
announced that the government would not consider an early election in 2011.
ND managed to elect five governors including two with the support of LAOS.
Although it was clear that ND did not win the elections, Samaras claimed that
the results signalled a ‘total recall’ for his party and that the difference to PASOK
was diminished. In the regions where PASOK and ND supported candidates
independently of LAOS, ND was approximately 2% behind PASOK. However,
if we take into account that ND supported more candidates with LAOS than
PASOK did, the difference between PASOK and ND was probably higher, prob-
ably around 4.3%.2 The enthusiasm of Samaras can, therefore, be justified
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only from the perspective of the 2009 defeat where ND had the worst electoral
result in its 35-year history. Moreover, Samaras’ personal choice of supporting
candidates, such as Kikilias, may have cost ND a victory, but consolidated his
leadership.
Although LAOS leader Georgios Karatzaferis spoke of a success for his
party, the results show that his party fared very badly in the elections. LAOS
candidates fared consistently worse than the 2009 parliamentary election. For
instance, in Attica, LAOS MP Adonis Georgiadis got only 6.57% of the vote
(calculated by aggregating the four constituencies of the region) compared to
the 7.2% of 2009. Similarly, in the constituency of Kastoria where LAOS came
third in 2009 (4.46%) its share in 2010 was only 2.7%. Most likely the results
were related to the controversial decision of LAOS to support the memorandum
in parliament. It seems, therefore, that Karatzaferis enthusiasm had more to do
with LAOS emerging as a credible coalition partner of ND under the new leader
(cf. Gemenis, 2008: 97; 2010: 356–357) than anything else.
Conversely, KKE could claim a small victory as it increased both its share of
the vote and the absolute number of its voters. SYRIZA, however, fared worse
than expected which is probably not surprising considering the fierce competi-
tion it faced since the left of the political spectrum was overcrowded by parties
trying to take advantage of the rather low effective threshold for representation.
Having said that, the combined support for parties of the left was the greatest
since the parliamentary election of 1981.
An important aspect of the regional elections was the low turnout (officially
60.88% and 46.68% for the two rounds, respectively) although there was con-
siderable variation from region to region (Kafe et al. 2011). Considering, how-
ever, the poor record keeping in the Greek electoral register which inflates the
number of registered voters (Gemenis, 2008: 98), true turnout for the first round
has been estimated at 72.8% (Mavris, 2010). Spoiled ballots were around 5%,
higher than the 2009 parliamentary election but very similar to the 2006 mu-
nicipal and prefecture elections. What is most important, however, is that the
decrease in turnout did not affect all the candidates equally. It has been esti-
mated that twice as many PASOK than ND voters abstained from the regional
elections (Mavris, 2010). This implies that many PASOK voters who did not
support the PASOK lists, avoided voting for any of PASOK’s opponents simply
by choosing to abstain. ND, therefore, failed to sow the seeds of discontent and
the beneficiaries were primarily KKE and the small parties of the left.
The Post-election Political Landscape: Towards Frag-
mentation?
The U-turn of PASOK after Papandreou’s televised interview indicated that the
first regional elections were destined to be fought as second-order national
elections, where voters are expected to punish incumbent candidates and vote
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for the smaller parties (Mavris, 2003). In places, however, the vote had a local
character associated with the personal background of the candidates rather
than regional governance or national issues. Nevertheless, the disproportional
electoral system, together with the low turnout and the fragmentation of the
opposition allowed PASOK to win the election at least in terms of appearances
and continue with the troika-proposed reforms. Popular discontent, however,
remained strong and the strikes continued unabated.
At the parliamentary level this discontent was expressed with further frag-
mentation of the party system. Apart from the aforementioned split in SYN
which established the Democratic Left as the sixth parliamentary party, Bakoy-
annis announced the creation of her own party the week after the second round
of the regional elections. Called the Democratic Alliance, the party showcased
the latest attempt to create a liberal-conservative party. By the end of January
2011, four MPs and one MEP resigned the ND whip and joined Bakoyannis,
making Democratic Alliance the seventh party represented in parliament. More-
over, Dimaras, who previously announced that he would resign as anMP after
his failure to be elected governor of Attica, changed his mind and decided to
form a new party together with another ex-PASOK MP, whereas by June 2010
three additional MPs resigned the PASOK whip reducing the party’s parliamen-
tary caucus to 154 MPs.
The national issues surrounding the troika and the memorandum are clearly
responsible not only for the observed fragmentation in the party system but also
for the reluctance of parties and their candidates to set an agenda for regional
governance. The 2010 regional elections can, therefore, be interpreted as a
lost opportunity for regional governance and as a second-order election which
signalled hard times ahead for the government and the country.
Notes
1The municipalities of Athens and Thessaloniki have been controlled by ND candidates since
the mid- 1980s. PASOK managed this double breakthrough by supporting independent can-
didates (former ombudsman George Kaminis in Athens and winemaker and environmentalist
Yannis Boutaris in Thessaloniki) together with the Ecologist Greens and the Democratic Left.
2See Mavris and Symeonidis (2010). In the cases where ND and PASOK supported candi-
dates together with LAOS, Mavris and Symeonidis subtracted the 2009 parliamentary election
result of LAOS. The votes to ND and PASOK rebels were considered as votes for the respec-
tive parties, with the exception of the votes to Dimaras which were split among different parties
according to the opinion poll estimates of Public Issue.
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